crimination in this sense carries the connotation of knowledgeable distinctions, not merely prejudicial ones.
If we turn now to ecological thinking, the importance of speciesism in this second sense becomes clear. Animal rights remains based on liberal notions of the individual subject. Regan's subject-of-a-life criterion exemplifies this. From an ecological perspective, however, the operative category in debates about biodiversity, sustainability, endangered status, conservation, and preservation is the species, not the individual. Keith Tester makes this clear when he writes that for an animal rights protester against fox hunting, for instance, it is the suffering or welfare of the individual fox that is at stake. For the ecologist, it is the welfare of the species as a whole that is at stake, and also the welfare of the entire habitat, not only of vulpes vulpes in isolation, but of foxes in their relations with all other species: the entire ecosystem of the bioregion in which said foxes live. Preserving as much wilderness as possible, and tackling corporate interests that are indiscriminately plundering the globe, become important emphases for deep and social ecology. Once ecocriticism has become part of the equation, the analogy with New Social Movements in their liberal-enlightened focus on individual subjects breaks down. Species-being, and flourishing, replaces individual lives, their suffering, and their right-to-life or death, as the critical criterion for determining ethical action. According to this logic, wildlife conservation and the maintenance of biodiversity might require an engagement with recreational hunting, for instance. This is a different terrain of debate from the philosophical one of "thinking with animals" which, in their different ways, Claude Levi-Strauss, Derrida, Vicki Hearne, Haraway, Paul Patton, Erica Fudge, and Wolfe have pioneered. I want to shift the terrain once more to a slightly less Eurocentric, or Euroamerican one, by considering the dog's eye view of human-animal relations given us by the Nobel prize-winning Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk, poised between Europe and Asia. Recent discussions of Jürgen Habermas's theory of the public sphere have begun to acknowledge the coffeehouse's Arab and Ottoman roots. At the heart of Pamuk's conjuring of the early modern coffeehouses of Istanbul is a dog, both a dog who lives at the coffeehouse, where his master is a storyteller, and a representation of a dog, a drawing or sketch. The dog remarks that a puritanical cleric from Erzurum has been seeking to have the coffeehouses closed down because they encourage social mixing and sedition; the cleric is afraid that men "become so besotted with coffee" that they "actually listen to and believe what dogs and mongrels have to say." 3 The dog, after having enjoyed some coffee himself, poured out for him by his master, retorts:
With your permission, I'd like to respond to this last comment by the esteemed cleric. . . . I'm a great admirer of our coffeehouses. . . . In the lands of the infidel Franks, the so-called Europeans, every dog has an owner. These poor animals are paraded on the streets with chains around their necks, they're fettered like the most miserable of slaves and dragged around in isolation. . . . Dogs who roam the streets of Istanbul freely in packs and communities, the way we do, dogs who threaten people if necessary, . . . such dogs are beyond the infidels' conception. . . . It's not that I haven't thought that this might be why followers of the Erzurumi oppose praying for dogs and feeding them meat on the streets of Istanbul in exchange for divine favors and even why they oppose the establishment of charities that perform such services. If they intend both to treat us as enemies and make infidels of us, let me remind them that being an enemy to dogs and being an infidel are one and the same.
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I recommend thinking with Pamuk, and Pamuk's dog, about identity politics. This dog, resident of the early modern Ottoman public sphere, perceives certain cultural differences between East and West that may appear quite strange, hence defamiliarizing, to a Western audience: the free and the unfree, the happy and the enslaved, may appear reversed. This is why consorting with mongrels in coffeehouses amounts to sedition, never a bad idea in political and philosophical discussions if we seek to pursue elusive truths. This dog's-eye view reveals above all how imbricated East/West and infidel/non-infidel remain, despite their differences, for all subjects poised on the frontier between Europe and Asia.
Which brings me to Wolfe's attempt to secure, by targeting the limits of postcolonial criticism, a certain radicalism for Animal Rites. Wolfe writes, "Bhabha's work stands in relation to the gray gorillas as Crichton's does to the Kigani. This is to suggest not that Bhabha is wrong, but that he is only half right." 5 "Half right" echoes punningly as "half write"-Homi Bhabha has written only half the story. Might there also be, especially in relation to those gray gorillas, another echo of Bhabha's famous formulation about the colonial other in mimicry being "not quite not-white"? Not that Bhabha is wrong, but that he is only half white. Perhaps the gray of those gorillas might mark an advance toward the whiteness of enlightenment? Mired in postcoloniality, Bhabha is still harping on brown. He hasn't changed into his gorilla suit, or become a wolf in sheep's clothing, or even in wolf's clothing. If he were a proper theorist of postmodernity, that is, Bhabha, like Wolfe, would be able to see the animals for the people, which is essential for "making one's name" as a Wolfe.
6 Surely the point of animal studies in the humanities, or of books like Animal Rites, is not merely to displace, according to the imperatives of academic fashion, other critical-social movements, such as feminism, anti-racism, or postcolonial theory? For here is where an opportunity to do some real work-of articulation not trashing-(re)presents itself: listening to dogs.
Bruce Boehrer:
My original input to this discussion was cast in the form of satire. Out of respect for those who felt their oxen gored unfairly by that initial intervention, I will contribute this time in more sober fashion.
Like most of us in this conversation, I'm a literary historian by trade. This occupation has chosen me at least as much as I have chosen it, since as far as I can tell there is nothing else in the wide world at which I am sufficiently competent to make a living. Given that my life's principal talent seems to involve reading books that interest no one else; identifying figures of speech, literary allusions, and parallels of plot; and writing books that interest no one else, I am perhaps understandably uneasy when my profession calls upon me to take a stand on questions of a political and ethical nature. Hence, in fact, my initial recourse to satire: not only do I see little reason to believe that my profession is capable of making a serious difference in such questions; I am also confident that any effort I might make to stand up for my own beliefs would in the end do more harm than good. I have neither the charisma, the energy, the personal consistency, nor the record of commitment and activism that one would expect of an advocate for a cause. In the event, satire seems the most appropriate political intervention for someone of my modest attainments.
And yet my own work has dragged me toward questions of animal rights and ecopolitics. I didn't plan things that way; I'm not that smart. I just pursued questions that I found interesting: why does William Shakespeare elide feminine and animal nature as forcefully as he does in A Midsummer Night's Dream? Why does John Milton contemplate the nature of marriage and the character of bestiality in the same book of Paradise Lost? Why do parrots appear as often as they do in early sixteenth-century anti-papal satire? I didn't conceive of these questions as inherently connected to a program of social activism. Frankly, I thought of them more as an exercise in old-fashioned philology, bolstered perhaps by some more recent theoretical notions. And when my work began revealing its contemporary political implications and applications, I did not respond to these readily or well.
But I did begin to respond anyway, slowly and inadequately and with great gnashing of teeth, because the work left me no alternative. During the writing of Shakespeare Among the Animals, I became a vegetarian. Then I lapsed. Then I went vegetarian again. Then I lapsed again. And now, more securely than before, I'm back in the vegetarian fold. This has become a serious life choice for me, but precisely because I've done such a lousy job of implementing it, I feel I have no business presenting myself as an exemplar of the vegetarian commitment. I'm just a poor slob trying to evolve, and I see no reason to believe that my evolution will be of consequence to anyone but myself.
It is for this reason, too, that I continue to wear my old leather jacket. It dates from a difficult and unreconstructed time of my life, and while I hardly ever wear it at home anymore (one doesn't wear such things much in Florida, in any case), I do make a point of wearing it at conferences. It immediately punctures any pretensions I might make to animal-rights correctness, and for me it has become a necessary badge of shame. Erica has pointed out that the eating of meat in seventeenth-century England could function as an important symbolic activity: a reminder of our fallen nature and need of redemption. The leather jacket has become something similar for me.
So you may perhaps understand that when invited to consider-and still worse, to write a statement about-the politics of my scholarship, I find myself in exquisite discomfort. I share Wolfe's concern with the poisonous character of speciesism, although I'm not entirely convinced that in confronting it we must also "craft . . . a posthumanist theory of the subject." As Singer noted a long time ago, Hindu culture has long been more respectful of animal rights than has the Judaeo-Christian tradition; yet I see no reason to conclude therefore that the Hindu tradition is somehow posthumanist. And in any case, I'm sufficiently aware of my own personal inadequacies not to want someone like me standing up for the things I believe in. I'd rather just try to do them better.
Richard Nash: Donna's comments about listening to dogs and Bruce's, about sustaining arguments with oneself, are precisely the kinds of thinking we need to shuttle between as we theorize more ecologically our notion of "world" in light of the challenges that "the problem of the animal" raises in theoretical discussions, particularly for those critical and theoretical formulations that have been launched in the service of "identity politics." The politics of occupying less choate identities, while listening more attentively to companion species offers, I believe, the best chance for sustaining and inhabiting responsibly our worlds.
Trained, like Bruce, as a literary historian, and inheriting some hybridized mongrel pedigree of literary/cultural/intellectual historian, I am drawn to anecdote and implication. My microhistorical inclinations are never happier than when worrying a bone, whether material or intellectual; and lately my bones have tended to be canine and equine, filled with the marrow of race and politics, both global and local. I want to resist the temptation of those inclinations here, if only because they are so thoroughly grounded in my consciously humanist inheritance that it might be good for me to reach beyond those anecdotes to a horizon I only glimpse slightly, catch faint odors of on the breeze, hear only in attenuated and intermittent snatches.
In thinking this way, I find it especially helpful to turn to a least likely source. That is, indeed, a longstanding practice of mine, and I have no idea where it comes from. In this instance, that turning is to the philosophical work of a feminist physicist, Karen Barad. Her notion of agential realism theorizes our encounters with the world, and particularly the experimental space of physics, through a reconception of subject-object dualisms that refocuses on the resulting "phenomena" as "intra-actions" between assemblages of subjects, objects, and measuring apparatuses. There is much that is rich and powerful and productive in this theoretical refiguring of our world, and not least of those possibilities, it seems to me, is what such a re-orientation offers those of us who seek more useful descriptions and theories of our ecologies. The empiri-cist encounter that Barad is re-theorizing posits both observer and observed as possessing autonomous identities, while her re-articulation of that position generates a world in which agents move in and out of collaborative affiliations.
Such a re-thinking of the ontology of the world resonates in powerful ways with Haraway's provocative challenge to move evolutionary thinking beyond the paradigm of dominion to a serious articulation of what it means to think of "companion species." Our observations of the physical world have for some time now been demonstrating that ecology matters in fundamental ways to species evolution-that it simply does not work to imagine evolution of a species independent from its elaborate ecosystem. To that extent, we have rather thoroughly accepted a governing logic of interdependence that runs counter to the long-accepted doctrine of dominion, under which one species of animal domesticates another in the form of divinely sanctioned subordination. To think seriously of species co-evolving (canine and human, for instance) dramatically changes our constructions of ourselves and becomes an all the more important version of Donna's injunction that we do a better job of listening to dogs.
That is difficult for any number of reasons. The language barrier is, of course, a difficult one, and all acts of translation involve difficult crossings, not equally innocent. But some translations are harder than others, and Agamben's redeployment of Jakob von Uexkull's useful term umwelt seems to me remarkably helpful here. What is most challenging-and what I find stimulatingabout this notion of umwelt is the idea that creatures occupy different worlds, each inhabiting the umwelt rendered available by the perceiving sensorium. As species, dogs and humans may be thought to co-evolve, yet when they arrive in the form of two individuals-even if it is in that fictional coffeehouse-the space they occupy will necessarily be configured differently. As we listen to dogs, we must know that we cannot hear as well. Negotiating the translations across multiple umwelts that constitute an enormously more complex notion of "world" than that posited by Martin Heidegger is a daunting challenge, but is also an exciting possibility, one that offers as a byproduct a dramatic, and potentially productive, re-thinking of familiar categories of identity politics.
Erica Fudge: Donna offers a very helpful and succinct outline of core differences between liberal rights arguments about animals and ecological ones, and this is a distinction that might be used to distinguish ecocriticism from animal studies. It seems to me that the ecological argument, in which the species rather than the individual is emphasized, sits at the heart of much literary ecocriticism, in which landscape and nature in general are the focus and animals perceived only as part of that landscape. I am not denying that there is very sophisticated and interesting work going on in ecocriticism, just noting its particular interests. In animal studies, however, because the focus is on animals, the wider natural environment is the not the center of attention, although, of course, it can be vitally important to some work. The animalwhether real or ideal-is the focus, and this focus can bring with it emphasis on particular concerns, about the nature of agency, for example. Such a concern sits at the heart of the construction of the self of liberal humanism, and is familiar to all who are working in the humanities. But, in retaining this focus on agency, animal studies scholars may not simply be supporting the liberal humanist construction of the individual, or the conception of animal rights that emerges from liberal humanism (although some may be). Much of the work in the field proposes that animals can have agency, a perspective that challenges the very liberal humanism that constructed these ideas in the first place. 7 As Richard notes in his response here, it is possible to think about our "encounters with the world" as "intra-actions"-as actions between individuals (human or otherwise) that construct those individual actors. In such a world animals can have agency.
And this is where we can see most obviously the links between posthumanist ideas and animal studies. Clearly-and most obviously-the anthropocentrism of liberal humanism is challenged by animal studies (indeed, I wonder if the Humanities is still the Humanities after the entry of animals). By recognizing the cultural and philosophical centrality of animals, scholars are inevitably challenging the assumption of the centrality and significance of the human who exists in opposition to rather than in juxtaposition with animals. But we can go further. Neil Badmington offers a nice definition of posthumanism: it has, he argues, "interrogated the myth of humanism by activating the moments of pollution and the slow slide of certainties that have habitually been drowned beneath the white noise of uniqueness." He recognizes that animal studies can be part of posthumanist enquiry and, noting Wolfe's claim that cultural studies is "founded upon the repression of 'the question of nonhuman subjectivity,'" Badmington proposes that we refocus our attention on the nonhuman and rename the Humanities the Posthumanities. 8 For scholars working in animal studies, such a shift is not simply fashionable-following a critical trend-it is a recognition that a full analysis of so-called human culture must include animals: as geographers Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert have argued, "With the human domestication of animals and plants, the number of non-humans existing alongside people proliferates exponentially, making it impossible to recognise a pure 'human' society." 9 Virginia DeJohn Anderson's work on the role of the colonialists' cattle in the New World seems exemplary in this critical context.
So where does Wolfe's statement about speciesism sit here? Following Carol J. Adams, Derrida, and others, Wolfe sees inevitable and unbreakable links between the speciesist relegation of animals to the realm of the inferior other and the human repression of other humans. (I also found this in early modern constructions of the human. 10 ) For Adams, "the oppression of women and the other animals [are] interdependent" 11 ; for Derrida, Western philosophy relies upon the concept of this creature called "the animal" in order to establish and construct its own arguments which, in turn, prioritize a certain construction of the human. 12 Thus Wolfe's challenge to speciesism is not only or necessarily because he likes animals but because he sees the oppression of animals as inseparable from-foundational to-the oppression of humans. In these terms, if we challenge speciesist ideas we also challenge the construction of the human as a species splendid in its isolation from the natural world as a whole, and such a challenge can, surely, only impact positively on human relations with that natural world and the nonhuman animals that live in it.
And this takes me to Bruce's statement that our profession is not "capable of making a serious difference" to political and ethical debate. As early modern literary historians we are not tying ourselves to cranes to stop road construction, or endangering our lives at sea to highlight the destruction of the environment by the oil industry, or under threat of imprisonment for forcibly entering animal research labs. We are, however, involved in educating people-in the classroom and in published work-and this, as Louis Althusser knew, can be effective in challenging the status quo. I am not talking about convincing our students or our readers to become vegetarians. I am talking about doing what all good academics do best: asking our students and our readers to think about things that might otherwise go unthought-in the case of my own work, to think about what it means to be a human being; about how that being human has been constructed in history; about how that construction of the human that we live with now might impact upon the world we live in, the people we live alongside, and so on. It is all too easy to assume the human as a given and unproblematic category in the world, and in my work I want to probe the ways in which that assumption-that the human does not need to be thought, is not part of nature-has been constructed, what that construction allows us to do, and what scrutiny of the historically situated nature of that construction might do. I hope I do not preach; I hope that I open up for interrogation an important aspect of the way we live in the world. What my students or my readers do in their interrogation is their choice: my job is to prod towards thought.
Early Modern Studies is, I think, particularly well placed to allow us to do this. The early modern period, as its name suggests, is a period when many key aspects of the modern world begin to emerge-in terms of our conceptions of science, selfhood, global politics. To read Francis Bacon, or Michel de Montaigne, or René Descartes is to read debates about the self in relation to nature that continue to be played out in contemporary philosophy. As well as this, as we literary historians know, the early modern period is also full of extraordinary literary works, works that are infusing those philosophical ideas with wonder. For example, when Satan declares, in a challenge to God's power in Book I of Paradise Lost:
The mind is its own place, and in itself Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven.
What matter where, if I still be the same.
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Not only is he kidding himself, he is also reflecting, surely, Cartesian ideas about selfhood in which the self-the cogito-is tied to neither time nor place, but only to itself. Such a rendition of Descartes's idea (an idea that sits at the heart of liberal humanism) can hardly be read as a positive one, and perhaps we can read Adam and Eve's exit from Eden "hand in hand" at the end of Milton's epic as an alternative-more positive-way of being in a corrupt world, in which community and comradeship are preferred to individualism. 14 Donna argues that literature can defamiliarize the world, and she is surely right: Milton's representation of Cartesianism certainly fulfils this ideal. She proposes a contemporary Turkish dog story that leads us to think about very human differences-"East/West and infidel/non-infidel"-as a model of the way forward for literary studies. I wonder if we can't also find animals (more dogs, indeed) in early modern literature that are leading us to think about animals as well as humans. For me, the oh-so-brief story in The Two Gentlemen of Verona about the fate of the lapdog Proteus has sent to Silvia-it was, Lance says, "stolen from me by the hangman's boys in the market-place"-and Lance's replacement of it with his own dog, Crab, says a great deal about the lives of animals that are present in early modern literature. 15 These animals are utterly marginal (we never find out what happens to the stolen lapdog, although my imagination along with my knowledge of early modern ideas tells me it is unlikely to be a happy ending) but central to the plot; they are silent but speak volumes about their world; they are other and they are self. If we don't read these animals we miss out on crucial aspects of the period, of its construction of itself and its construction of all of us animals (human and nonhuman) now.
Robert Markley: The question of speciesism raised by the original panel at the Group for Early Modern Cultural Studies conference in February 2007
and addressed in this exchange by Donna, Bruce, Richard, and Erica centers on a very specific understanding of "species": the tiny populations of mammalian eukaryotes that make up an infinitesimally small percentage of the organisms sharing the earth. In different ways, all of my colleagues' comments about the significance of animal studies in the early modern period suggest that the concept of species itself is tied to particular constructions of Western moral philosophy, liberal political theory, traditions of literary and cultural criticism, and understandings of "modernity"-not to mention to the emergence of, and debates within, animal studies. Even if we situate the concept of species within a historical narrative of evolutionary biology-from Karl Linnaeus, to Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, to Stephen Jay Gould-we still risk reproducing a kind of eukaryotic provincialism that reinscribes a host of self-congratulatory assumptions and values about homo sapiens as the shepherd, manager, and conservator of the planet's biota.
In their comments, Donna and Richard call attention to the ways in which notions of species and ecology are mutually constitutive. Although most participants in debates about animal rights, and scholars of animal studies more generally, identify themselves as environmental activists, the ecologies that they typically invoke-whether in terms of habitat preservation, biodiversity, or landscape restoration-are those compatible with ideas of co-evolution that exist within the restricted framework of, let's call it, mammalian hegemony. But there are more microbes in heaven and earth (and everywhere in between) than are dreamt of in humanist philosophy, and any efforts to wrestle with the problems posed by speciesism have to recognize that ecology needs to be rethought in non-anthropocentric terms. In this regard, decentering humankind entails decentering our companion species as well-or, more usefully, expanding our understanding of "companion species" to include the innumerable species of bacteria and archaea without which we would neither exist nor have evolved. In this respect, I'd suggest that, by redefining the politics of species and speciation, we can develop ways to approach larger issues that (potentially) can get us out of the humanist/posthumanist cul-de-sac in animal studies: we can't live with the old humanism and we can't live without it.
In the 1970s, Carl Woese revolutionized microbiology by comparing molecular sequences (rRNA) that contain the code for ribosome, the complex structure, found in all cells, that makes proteins. Rather than trying to extend a concept of functional evolutionism that focused on structural adaptation, Woese developed technologies to study molecular sequence analysis and thereby offered a means to assess the evolutionary relationships between organisms: in brief, the greater the number of different gene sequences between two organisms, the greater the evolutionary distance between them. The outline of these relationships can be rendered schematically by what Woese calls the universal tree of life that divides biota into three phylogenetic domains: archaea, bacteria and eucarya (eucaryotes). From a technical perspective, the ability to identify organisms by gene sequences (frequently analogized to digital barcodes) allowed scientists to perform comparative analyses by removing genes from their environments (without the long and tricky process of culturing them), subjecting them to sequence analysis, and then situating them heuristically in relation to rapidly expanding libraries of other genetic sequences.
Because the study of rRNA and other genes from a variety of environments has increased exponentially scientific understanding of microbial diversity and distribution, the idea of species itself has undergone a revolution: distinguishing among species is no longer solely the product of structural taxonomies and comparisons but a heuristic-a set of complex inferences that can be drawn about evolutionary pathways, roads not taken, and abrupt and puzzling evolutionary ends. If we shift the focus from microbes to those small offshoots of eukaryotes that we call "animals" and "humans," the problems of genetic and therefore evolutionary relationships grow more, not less, complex. In common sense terms, the revolution in microbiology reveals that physiology-even seemingly self-evident adaptations like the opposable thumb-is not history, and that all evolution is co-evolution even "within" as well as between species.
In a series of profoundly challenging studies, presented for nonspecialists in books such as Microcosmos and What Is Life?, the evolutionary biologist Lynn Margulis has argued that species evolve by subsuming the genetic materialthe gene sequences-of other species. Evolution is not a tale of self-fashioning adaptation or a cause-and-effect response to environmental stimuli, but a matter of existing life forms-the thousands of archaea that have taken up residence in the digestive systems of animals, for example-adopting as well as adapting to their environments in order to ensure the survival of their species. Retreating from an atmosphere becoming increasingly toxic with their excreted oxygen a half a billion years ago, these anaerobic organisms sought symbiotic refuge in the hospitable environments of eukaryotic guts. What we think of as Darwinian evolution-the "ascent" to "man"-is, for Margulis, a process of multi-species co-evolution, ever sensitive to changing environmental conditions. Bruce Clarke, among others, has located Margulis's work in the context of second-order cybernetics as an adaptation and extension of James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis and its complex feedback loops between organism and environment. For Margulis, the question "what is life?" provokes a host of questions about the triggers, pathways, and consequences of speciation.
To talk seriously about co-evolution is to relinquish, as much as possible, our eukaryotic provincialism as well as our anthropocentrism without surrendering to romantic idealizations of a "harmonious" nature that never was and never will be. The question of speciesism, then, involves (at least) a double perspective on time and causation: evolutionary time (the object of scientific inquiry) and historical time (the subject of humanities). Evolutionary time is coeval with a geophysical time that can be glimpsed only through experiment rather than by experience. There is, after all, no way to bring the "reality" of the Jurassic era into the domain of the humanities except by computer-generated, Spielbergian graphics. The problems of this cross-disciplinary doubled perspective-which I've cast in terms that Margulis, Clarke, and Niklas Luhmann might find congenial-is also a way of seconding Latour's argument in We Have Never Been Modern: to privilege the historical time of the humanities is to remain entangled in the double-bind of philosophical and techno-scientific modernity, endlessly engaged in rituals of purification (the focus on speciation as classificatory mastery) and hybridization (defining coevolution by Dr. Dolittle-ing the animals). On the political implications of ecology touched on by Bruce, Richard, Erica, and Donna, I could hardly agree more. But if the question of speciesism encourages us to see the world in non-anthropocentric terms, a full understanding of the situatedness of eukaryotic evolution should remind us that, upon this bank and shoal of time, we face an ongoing eco-climatological crisis that threatens to sediment us into the fossil record. Donna Landry: Erica rightly insists upon the relevance of early modern history to the present; this is salutary. Bob suggests that we need to get to grips with evolutionary time as well as the humanties' homely zone, historical time; this is discomfiting but energizing. Following Bob following Margulis and Latour, we might redefine "companion species" to include bacteria and archaea. Hear, hear: Down with eukaryotic provincialism, onward with deep co-evolutionary thinking! One constraint on what would undoubtedly be a great leap forward is that heeding the call of the microbial Other will take time and investment. Conservationists such as Michael Samways observe that today's biodiversity measures are usually bluff: prestige species of vertebrates-black rhinos, tigers, cheetahs, elephants-function iconically; in so doing they attract funding; because they attract funding, they function iconically. Meanwhile 99% of the participants in biodiversity, the invertebrates, are left out of the calculus. For the short haul, then, we acknowledge that we belong to a prestige species: dogs are us; in the longer term, it's insects and microbes who will share our sedimented fossildom.
CARY WOLFE'S RESPONSE: "OF PEOPLE, PLANTS, POLITICS, AND A '-POST'"
I've been working recently on an essay, which will be expanded into a short book, called "Before the Law: Animals in a Biopolitical Context," and I mention it because many of the issues taken up there bear directly upon some of the major strands in these conversations. A central question in my current project is this: How does our understanding of not just the ethical but also the political status of nonhuman animals change when we shift the context from the liberal justice tradition of rights discourse (not just the picture of the subject that it takes for granted, but also a certain notion of politics it relies upon) to the rearticulation of politics as biopolitics that reaches from Michel Foucault's late work up through contemporary thinkers such as Judith Butler, Roberto Esposito, Derrida, Paolo Virno (Virno is in a rather different register-but one directly related to Donna's asides on the Marxian concept of "species-being") and, of course, Agamben? I mention this in part to continue and in part to retool the conversation between (mainly) Donna, Erica, and Bob on this point. The shift in what we regard as the constitutive elements in a political relation within a biopolitical frame is rather directly related to the divide they trace between environmentalism and animal rights. In the context of biopolitics one might hold, as Esposito and Agamben do, that it is not just nonhuman animals but rather life itself, globally, that becomes the direct object of political power in its modern form, and that an affirmative (rather than, with Agamben, a "thanatological") biopolitics requires the rearticulation of the ethical and political relation beyond the boundaries of what we used to call "the subject." Under biopolitics, the subject-and with it the human/animal distinction-becomes a floating signifier in a second-order operation, one that can be deployed as needed to supplement the first-order political work of rendering certain beings "killable but not murderable" (Agamben), of "making live and letting die" (Foucault).
I bring the context of biopolitics to bear because when we move away from what you might call a "subject-centered" ethics and into what has sometimes been called a "biocentric" perspective, then we are bound to end up, I think, in another iteration of the environmental ethics vs. animal rights debates from the 1970s, debates that I don't see this conversation really advancing. (That's not a criticism, as Erica notes, just a description of a predictable problem.) As Erica points out, on the one side (biocentrism/environmental ethics), you have people for whom the constitutive unit of the ethical relation is not the individual organism but things like ecosystems (or, agential assemblages if you want to phrase it in Barad/Latour/DeLanda-ese), and that in turn spurs very real political and legal questions such as "should trees have standing?" (to quote the title of a famous essay from that period in environmental studies). Maybe keystone species of trees are more important than the nutria that run around under them. (A more refined version of the biocentrism position, espoused by some of the Deep Ecology people and their fellow travelers, is that biodiversity is the fundamental ethical value, but then that leads to predictable problems around indigeneity vs. "weed" species, etc.-its own version of the problems with the concept of "species" noted by Bob.) On the other side (the "animal" side), you have people like Singer and Regan for whom ethics is subject-centered and depends upon the possession of such-and-such attributes which must be respected and protected from exploitation and violence wherever we find them, regardless of species. For them, the question that I get asked all the time when I talk about these things-"what about plants?"-is a non-issue.
This schism between these two orientations comes to a head routinely in conversations, for example, about how to deal with the exploding populations of white tail deer or feral hogs. And it also comes to a head (with a little different savor, to be sure) when critics of biocentrism ask whether forms of biodiversity such as ebola virus or anthrax should be allowed to achieve their distinctive forms of flourishing, even if it means a reduction of the population of homo sapiens by, say, 70 percent. The other shoe that never quite drops in the panel discussion between Donna, Bob, Richard, Erica, and Bruce (though Bob comes close to dropping it at a couple of points) is that the serious (and not just fair weather) biocentrist can't take these as merely rhetorical questions. After all, homo sapiens is, hands down, the most destructive species on the planet in terms of its effect on biodiversity, habitat, and so on. As the subtitle of a New Yorker article from May 25, 2009, puts it, "There have been five great die-offs in history. This time, the cataclysm is us." 16 I think Bob's opening salvo about "eukaryotic provincialism" is right on target, but then someone is going to have to explain why it's okay to wipe out forms of life that happen to imperil the most destructive species on the planet (us) if we've thrown out the "eukaryotic provincialism" (much less Singer/ Regan, "biographical being") yardstick. Should a horse-to pick Richard's favorite animal-be treated the same as a houseplant? Does the question even make sense outside of a densely specified-that is, radically contingentcontext? If not, is it okay that all living beings are thus potentially means and not ends in some utilitarian calculus? Isn't that exactly the problem with biopolitics in its thanatological declension? The only guidance I have suggested on this topic is that however we answer those questions, we must agree that the absurdly blunt instrument of the human/animal distinction is of no use in answering them (a modest proposal). Nor is "eukaryotic provincialism" or "terrestrialism" or "mammalism" or "four-leggerism."
There's no way to reconcile or otherwise ameliorate these two views of ethics, nor is it the case, as Donna suggests, that when ecocriticism enters the equation that the analogy with New Social Movements breaks down; rather, it's simply a different New Social Movement that's being used for critical/political leverage to legitimize a certain cultural studies enterprise (a point gestured to-humorously if politely-by Bruce). Both kinds of ethics have insights and strengths to recommend them in certain situations, and both have blind spots that are best disclosed by shifting to the other frame in certain situations. (A fully elaborated theoretical description of how and why this is so may be found not in my work on "animals" but in my engagement over the years with the work of Luhmann, Humberto Maturana, and Francisco Varela.) To those who think that ethics is what Singer and Regan think it is, this will sound like a copout. To those who think that ethics is what Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard think it is, it will sound like wisdom.
Happily, on this point-I hope it is clear from my earlier work-I am a thoroughgoing Derridean, though I would hasten to add that the insistence that there is no before-the-fact, anterior-to-the-case formula for what constitutes the right and just thing to do in a particular instance is widespread in contemporary philosophy, and not just continental philosophy. And I would suggest that it-not the Singer/Regan line-also more accurately describes what our ethical lives and behavior are actually like: messy, pragmatic, self-interested, but also sometimes surprisingly altruistic, idealistic, and inspired. In this regard, I share the posture sketched by Bruce in his brief remarks: vigilance in the face of certain failure, the call to responsibility in the face of which one will always be found wanting, the leather jacket as the mark and reminder of shame, failure, and complicity. To those who think that such a view of ethics is tantamount to "What, me worry?," the retort is, "You're damned right." That is one reason (but only one) that "posthumanism" as I use the term isn't lofty or transcendent or delirious or the latest thing from The Sharper Image; on the contrary, it returns us to our messy, material, and embodied contingency-including (but not limited to) our evolutionary inheritance and symbiotic entanglements as animals, as fellow creatures. To use Richard's term, posthumanism is "mongrel."
This view of ethics is part of the reason (but only part) that it makes no sense to say that I "implicitly endorse" the animal rights philosophy of either Singer or Regan. I think I make that pretty clear in the opening chapter of Animal Rites, among other places. And my purpose in quoting Spivak in the passage Donna notes is to emphasize, as Erica articulates so well, that "the animal question" is two-tiered: there is the discursive machine of speciesism and the human/ animal distinction (almost always a hierarchy, but not necessarily always-an insight that Agamben's and Esposito's interventions have added to the mix); and there is the separate but overlapping question of actual nonhuman animals, their specific umwelts (to use Uexkull's wonderful concept that Richard invokes) and their plight in the world. The point of the Spivak quotation is simply, as Erica notes, that if we allow the human/animal distinction to remain intact (and we shouldn't-it isn't even good science, for starters, as Bob rightly suggests), then the machinery of speciesism and animalization will be available to use against various subjugated groups, animal or human, as history well shows. (How this could be read as attempting to "displace" other critical movements such as anti-racism or postcolonial theory to appear more-radicalthan-thou utterly escapes me, since "animalization" is maybe the main strategy that has subtended and supplemented racism and imperialism for centuries. It is only more "radical" in that precise, etymological sense.) Which brings us back to biopolitics, and to Agamben's recognition that the human/animal distinction is a rather floating one, as is the quite different distinction of bios from zoe, and where they cross is almost always a hot zone, politically speaking. What I'm trying to add to Agamben's equation is that it's a hot zone not just for human beings (and, Bob and Donna are right, not just for "animals"). By focusing on the material dispositifs and mechanisms of domination and violence that cross species lines (as Derrida and Esposito articulate better than Agamben, I think), the biopolitical frame helps us to see that the treatment of animals (in, say, factory farming) isn't just an embarrassing sideline of modern society that can be handled, say, with an adjacent and non-intersecting body of anti-cruelty laws, but is rather a directly political issue, and not just (we already knew this) a directly ethical problem. (Here, Marx's concept of "species-being," as revamped in the services of biopolitics by Virno, is very much to the point in a way that remains, in Marx himself, recontained by his humanism-that is to say, by his vision of the human as animal laborans and the rest of creation as "a giant workhouse," to use Theodor Adorno's biting phrase, for the self-realization of the human through labor.
17 )
The work I am outlining and that occupies much of the discussion here is the work that Bhabha, much as I admire him, doesn't quite do. (To call my engagement of Bhabha a "trashing" is not just melodramatic but an obvious misrepresentation of the tone and tenor of my handling of his work.) Bhabha's model of "cultural translation" smuggles back in through the back door a quite identifiably humanist schema of the subject of ethics and politics-that is to say, who can be party to such a relationship. Thus the point isn't (as Donna suggests is my view) that Bhabha isn't "white" enough; the point, from this angle, is that he is too "white." Similarly, were her dog a dog I would listen to it (or more precisely, to "him" or "her" since, as Derrida shrewdly notes, referring to animals as "it" simply reinforces their generic nature). Ironically enough, it's precisely that genericism that's on display in the passage Donna quotes from Pamuk. Once again, we have the animal as stand-in, ventriloquist dummy, and vehicle-a tried and true literary convention, to be sure, but one that has nothing to do with "listening to dogs" in the sense that Richard has in mind when he notes that "as we listen to dogs, we must know that we cannot hear as well."
Real "listening" means being willing to have our own modes of perception, our own habits of knowledge, our own prerogatives of power, interrogated by taking seriously the radical alterity of other, nonhuman, ways of being in the world, ways that demonstrably can be communicated to us, and are all the time, if we know how to listen. And that's one decisive difference, at least, between listening to dogs and listening to plants. To revisit the Cartesian distinction analyzed so well by Derrida, plants "react," dogs "respond"-with the proviso that the boundary between reacting and responding is itself porous, unstable, and deconstructed. And this-for reasons I discuss in my opening essay in the recent volume Philosophy and Animal Life, but can't take up within these confines-is one reason (but only one) that "the animal question" is but a subset of the much larger challenge of (for lack of a better term) "posthumanism." 18 NOTES
